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I’m looking to change the design of this blog slightly, and perhaps incorporate more of a magazine format. I have lots of ideas that may or may not be implemented, but since I’m no expert with the technical aspect of these things it may take a while. I also hope to be adding a co-blogger to this site (or more). If you happen to be interested in joining the blog, and feel you fit the description of the site (an “outsider on the inside“, interested in the Middle East and a student in politics/IR/liberal arts in general) contact me.

So this is just a notice, and any changes/complications with the site will probably be because of this. Hopefully you’ll see some changes soon.

And if you have any comments or suggestions for the site, drop me a line and let me know through the contact page.

There’s an article in the NYT today in which American interrogators have issued a report to the Iraqi government claiming that Hezballah has been training Iraqi militias inside Iran. This information is said to have come from interrogations of four Shiite militia members detained late last year, yet the report raises more questions than it does to address concerns of Iranian involvement in Iraq. As the article notes, this is not a fresh accusation by any means, and similar reports have been published by the Times itself. From today’s report:

There has been debate among experts about the extent to which Iran is responsible for instability in Iraq. But President Bush and other American officials, in public castigations of Iran, have said that Iran has been consistently meddlesome in Iraq and that the Iranians have long sought to arm and train Iraqi militias, which the American military has called “special groups.”

In a possible effort to be less obtrusive, it appears that Iran is now bringing small groups of Iraqi Shiite militants to camps in Iran, where they are taught how to do their own training, American officials say.

The militants then return to Iraq to teach comrades how to fire rockets and mortars, fight as snipers or assemble explosively formed penetrators, a particularly lethal type of roadside bomb made of Iranian components, according to American officials. The officials describe this approach as “training the trainers.”

The training, the Americans say, is carried out at several camps near Tehran that are overseen by the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Command, and the instruction is carried out by militants from Hezbollah, which has long been supported by the Quds Force. American officials say the Hezbollah militants perform several important roles for the Iranians.

To some, this is just another piece of evidence of Iranian meddling in Iraqi affairs. If you continue reading the article, it goes on to list some of the roles Hezballah plays for the Iranians, such as allowing Arabs to be trained by other Arabs, apparently facilitating some level of trust. However, Iran’s involvement in Iraq has been long known, and the roles it has played in training, arming, and financing militias has always been suspect. I read this report in a different context.

Hezballah, an illegal militia created and funded by foreigners, has not only been able to dwarf Lebanon’s armed forces in power and capability, but is making a run to position itself as the legitimate coercive force of the country. It has had the capacity to start and fight a war on behalf of its country, with no input from the elected government, and now “controls” significant areas of Lebanon to which it allows and denies access, even to the nation’s army. The training of foreign fighters by Hezballah only underscores the point that the battle for Lebanese sovereignty is a primary issue in dealing with the creeping Iranian hegemony in the region. This issue should not be perceived as secondary to Iran’s nuclear development or their standoff with the West, but is in fact critical to the resolution of these issues. Any discussions with Iran should place Iran’s interference in Lebanese affairs as a priority.

Michael Slackman is one of the better journalists covering Egypt.  He manages to capture some of the absurd realities which make Cairo one the most fascinating cities in the world, and his latest article in the NYT delves into the abundance of noise which is characteristic of the city:

While noise is never cited as a reason for the spasms of violence, it is a silent enemy that makes the pressures of life that much harder to cope with, people on the streets here said.

“The noise bothers me, and I know it bothers people,” said Abdel Khaleq, driver of a battered black and white taxi as he paused from honking his horn to stop for passengers.

“So why do you do it?” he was asked.

“Well, to tell you I’m here,” he said. “There is no such thing as logic in this country.”

And then he drove off, honking.

I highlighted a report on the Muslim Brotherhood earlier in the day; here’s one from Amr Hamzawy and Mohammed Herzallah of the Carnegie Endowment on the recent local elections in Egypt nearly a week and a half ago. The argument here is basically that these elections signify a backward trend of political progress in the country. The authors point to a reversion of behavior by the regime to its more autocratic methods of political practice in this recent election cycle, as well as the issue of inflation and unemployment which have been plaguing the country (recently Western media sources have been covering what is being referred to as the “Bread Crisis“, and similar effects around the world).

The authors then tackle the issue of the MB’s decision to boycott the April 8th elections, which came the day before and was issued in the face of a familiar series of crackdowns on the group from the government. The government had imprisoned nearly 1,000 Brotherhood members and the majority of candidates which the group had planned to field, placing the decision to boycott in an understandable context. Hamzawy and Herzallah argue, however, that this decision by the Brotherhood should call into question whether the country indeed has a legitimate opposition group which is capable of advancing an agenda of political freedom and reform. An excerpt from that section of the report follows:

Notwithstanding the regime’s intransigence and its violations of the law, the irregular attitude with which the Muslim Brotherhood approached the local election crisis stands in conspicuous contrast to the consistent participatory approach to which it had committed earlier. In an interview conducted in late February, a few days after the Brotherhood announced that it would
participate in the local elections, Muhammed Habib, the first deputy of the General Guide, outlined the chief reasons behind his movement’s commitment to participation in the April local elections despite all the restrictions. He emphasized preserving an active channel of communication with the public to exchange ideas and programs, underscoring the movement’s commitment to peaceful reform, keeping the public space in a dynamic condition in the face
of continued undemocratic pressures, maintaining a positive public atmosphere, and sustaining vigor and debate within the Brotherhood’s ranks.

Various statements made by the Muslim Brotherhood expressed similar sentiments and stressed that the Brotherhood’s cause is legitimate and protected by the Egyptian constitution. On the whole, the fact that the movement was determined to run in the elections was not in question. Indeed, participation at all costs offered the Brotherhood a valuable opportunity to challenge the regime’s power and demonstrate its ability to remain a vital force in Egyptian politics. In an interview on April 5, Mahmoud Izzat, a member in the Brotherhood’s Guidance Bureau, stated that the movement would not boycott the elections regardless of what happened.7 The fact that
Izzat made this statement two days before the Brotherhood announced its boycott of the elections indicated that the final decision had been made hastily and had not been subjected to extensive internal deliberations.

To the degree that the movement intended to retaliate for the regime’s flagrant actions, its decision may not pay off. After all, keeping the Muslim Brotherhood out of the local councils was the intention of the ruling establishment in the first place. What’s more, the movement is setting a dangerous precedent that the regime will certainly keep in mind: through sufficient political persecution and repression, the authorities can count on the Brotherhood to take itself voluntarily out the political equation.

You can find the full report here.

In comments made last week, U.S Secretary of State Condolezza Rice stated her aim to gather support from Arab nations in an effort to counter Iran’s “nefarious influence” in Iraq.  Rice, who is scheduled to attend a conference on Iraq in Kuwait next Tuesday, said she would push for more Arab support of Iraq in terms of financing and an increase of Sunni participation in the country’s politics:

“What they need to do is confirm and work for Iraq’s Arab identity,” she said. “That in and of itself will begin to shield (Iraq) from influences of Iran that are nefarious influences,” Rice said at a news conference.

She also said Iraq’s Arab neighbors could help encourage the Sunni minority to participate more fully in the political process in Iraq and to offer Baghdad much-needed debt relief, which has been slow in coming. 

In response, the Iranian Foreign Ministry has accused the Secretary of “Iranophobia”:

“Regarding Rice’s statements, these statements are not something new. American officials follow the policy of Iranophobia,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Ali Hosseini told reporters in a weekly news conference.

“We see the developments in Iraq today are the outcome of the U.S. administration’s illogical policies. The American officials want to externalise the problems they are facing inside Iraq,” he said, adding U.S. policies in Iraq had failed.

 

In keeping with a similar theme to a previous post of mine (in response to a post at FPWatch), I thought this report by Joshua Stacher was worth a small write-up.  Some may remember his article published last year in the Boston Globe along with Samer Shahata arguing that in light of the Brotherhood’s electoral successes, a policy of engagement is warranted.The attitudes towards the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in the West are beginning to change, and despite some long-held reservations about the group Western governments seem to be opening up to the idea of responsible engagement with a major Islamist force in the region. 

While I generally have little problem with the notion of talking to the Muslim Brotherhood, a change from the current prevailing policy of non-engagement would not come without its share of implications.  Firstly, as Stacher makes note of in his report, there are many ‘grey areas’ surrounding the MB.  These include “political pluralism,the use of violence, the principles of equal citizenship and universal human rights, and the relationship between religion and state.” Yet with this acknowledgement two policy recommendations are made concerning the relationship of Western governments towards the MB. What I find laudable about these recommendations is that they are presented in the context of the Egyptian political landscape as a whole. While I can’t find the paper to link to right now, I have argued in the past that while increased engagement of the countries’ theocrats is warranted, it should not come at the expense of Egypt’s other political factions, no matter how ineffective they have proven to be. In other words, the West should not embolden the theocrats at the expense of the democrats in the country, who equally have not been given a fair playing field to run their political activities. Stacher presents his recommendations in this context, one which I think is missing at times in other analyses of Western policy towards the MB.

The two recommendations are essentially that the West should increase its pressure on the Egyptian government for political reform which would allow for plurality in the system, while increasing efforts to open up channels of communication between the country’s opposition parties, including the MB. According to the executive summary, a future report is in the works which will highlight some of the more critical aspects of these policy recommendations and their implications. 

I am no fan of the Brotherhood, and will continue to have my reservations against the group.  However a broader policy of communication with both the theocrats and democrats of Egypt’s political opposition, with care taken not to promote any particular group and stimulate the freedom political activity in the country, would be in the interest of the country as a whole.

You can download the entire report here.

Update: Here is a previous post of mine over at MidEastYouth, in which I expressed some of my reservations towards the Muslim Brotherhood’s position as Egypt’s political opposition, with an important quote from Saad Eddin Ibrahim.  I was arguing for an empowerment of the ’silent majority’ Ibrahim speaks of through conditional U.S aid to Egypt:

The fact of the matter is Egypt, and the regime ruling it is extremly dependant on U.S support, which they have maintained through the illusion of the Muslim Brotherhood as the main political opposition. Secular parties are banned from forming or even gathering, charged with fabricated accusations of crime and effectively marginalised, yet to much less media fanfare than news of Brotherhood members being arrested. This is not unintentional, and as democracy activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim said in a recent interview (asked about the Brotherhood being the largest opposition group link:

We could not organize rallies, we could not organize marches or demonstrations because of emergency laws. Emergency laws have been in effect since 1981, since the assassination of President [Anwar] Sadat. So for the last 26 years, these emergency laws have prevented secularists from going out and organizing and mobilizing.

On the other hand, the Muslim Brothers have the mosques, and that is an advantage that is without design probably by the regime, but it has played in their favor. Meanwhile, I do not like to exaggerate their constituency because despite the fact that they have freer space to move in, still their share in the last Egyptian parliamentary election was 20 percent out of the 20 percent [of registered voters who actually voted]. So, 77 percent of the registered voters did not like to vote for them, nor to vote for the regime. And that is a 77 percent that I consider to be the silent majority, the potential constituency for liberal-democratic parties whenever liberal-democratic parties are allowed full freedom to operate.

I’ve been rather busy lately, so apologies for the lack of posts. Regular posting will resume tonight or tomorrow.

We hear so often of the casualties of the Iraq war, mainly in its human toll.  Yet Iraqi society and culture at large has suffered tremendously as well, one instance of which was the looting of the Iraqi National Library and Archives 5 years ago:

The sacking of the library that began April 11, 2003, was a bad one. The current Director of Iraq’s National Library and Archive, Dr. Saad Eskander, estimates that over three days, as many as “60 percent of the Ottoman and Royal Hashemite era documents were lost as well as the bulk of the Ba’ath era documents…. [and] approximately 25 percent of the book collections were looted or burned.” Other Iraqi manuscript collections and university libraries suffered similar fates.

Since then, Iraqis have once again tried to rebuild their library. The occupying powers have played along, but like so much about the Iraq War, their effort has been marked by ineptitude, hypocrisy and a cruel disregard for Iraqi people and culture.

An issue of much deliberation in the blogosphere lately has been the initiation of negotiations with Hamas. Former U.S President Jimmy Carter has recently made his intentions known, once again, that he’d favor meeting with the Palestinian group in light of the increasing failure of the current American policy of isolation. Barack Obama has issued a weak statement in opposition to the proposed meeting between Carter and Khaled Meshaal in Syria next week, citing Hamas’ refusal to recognize Israel and its status as a terrorist organization as his reasons. A recent post by Jeb Koogler over at FPWatch, a blog which I’d highly recommend for daily reading, takes umbrage at the presidential candidate’s statement and expresses disappointment at a lack of courage in Obama’s position to speak out against the Bush administration’s failing policy of isolation and containment. I found myself responding to this post by debating out loud the words displayed on my computer screen, not necessarily in disagreement with Jeb but with an interest to examine the implications of Carter’s meeting.

First, allow me to address the issue of Barack Obama in this discussion. While the consensus is that his response has been politically calculated, it was also weak at best and may serve to put some of his other positions into perspective. If a precondition for negotiation is the recognition of Israel, then U.S allies such as Saudi Arabia should accordingly be treated differently with regards to foreign policy. The current president has met with many heads of state whom have yet to recognize Israel. If the same conditions posed for a meeting with Hamas are applied to Iran, whose president Obama has indicated he is willing to meet with, his proposal suffers similar scrutiny. My take on Obama’s position towards meeting with America’s adversaries was that it was rooted in a moral and logical conviction, one which I was impressed by because of his perceived candor. His promised break from the failed policies of the past was refreshing, albeit slightly disconcerting if only for the inability to predict the implications of an alternative policy. Yet in light of his position towards Carter’s visit, Jeb’s expressed sentiment of disappointment is one I share.

However another aspect of this discussion which is conducive to disappointment has been the lack of mention of the metrics with which success of such a policy will be measured. In the same way the current policy of isolation and the insistence on preconditions for negotiations have had no historical precedent, the engagement of an Islamist group by the West with aim to push it towards moderacy has no precedent either. Therefore the advocacy of negotiations should not be cast as a solution to the crisis, but as a step towards eradicating a mentality which has caused such policy predicaments.

Looking solely at Carter’s visit though, I am tempted to declare that the reaction it is receiving from pundits and bloggers has been much ado about nothing. While providing the potential for a serious debate on the implications of such a policy, should it ever be officially adopted, the ensuing reaction has failed to deliver. For starters, a visit by Jimmy Carter will not realistically achieve anything significant, other than perhaps to attract a fair share of media coverage. I have not yet read what it is his visit is aiming to accomplish. Reports suggest “that the discussions will cover the issues of truce, prisoner swap and Palestinian reconciliation.” The Saudis and Egyptians have been negotiating these issues, with little success. The issues dividing the Palestinian factions are deeply nuanced. Carter will be attempting to accomplish what others have not been able to, and without any backing from an official body directly involved in the conflict.

And if it is not necessarily the intention of the former president to broker some sort of peace in the near future, his visit will be seen as an exercise of legitimizing Hamas in the eyes of the world. While one may argue that this is necessarily inevitable, given the support Hamas receives at home, without any significant change in U.S foreign policy this legitimization will only serve to anger allies who have been working within the realm of American policy to prescribe some sort of peace to the region. It could shift the moral authority in the way of Hamas, contrasting the U.S policy of isolation with its defiance by one of the country’s former leaders, and placing a measure of empathy on a group which has waged campaigns of terror in order to prevent peace in the past. It could potentially upset allies like Egypt, who will suffer from the parallel of increased engagement with Hamas with their treatment of the Muslim Brotherhood.

In principle, I am not an advocate of isolation and boycott. The United States should talk to some of its adversaries, given that there are predetermined goals which are to be reached, as well as a careful evaluation indicating the U.S would be able to realize those goals with engagement. And while I do not see the proposed trip by Carter as overly significant, I struggle to comprehend what the endeavor aims to accomplish. Unless an American administration declares its intentions to open a dialogue with Hamas, any visits by former officials will not only fail to solve the problems which exist in the Palestinian territories, but would add legitimacy to a group before the world is able to adjust its policies to handle the effects of that. Let us remember that there are significant moral arguments to be made against Hamas, and that the policy of isolation and boycott was not entirely misguided in its intent but rather its calculation and execution. It is time for a new policy towards Hamas, but it should not start with Jimmy Carter.

A recording released on Islamist sites yesterday featured Ayman Al-Zawahiri answering questions from followers and online Islamic forum readers. The offer to take questions had been posed in December, and the response seems to have been overwhelming:

The questions were posted in response to Ayman al Zawahri’s December solicitation for online questions from “friendly or hostile” individuals and organizations with the promise that they would be answered one month later.

Zawahri’s almost two-hour-long audio message addresses everything from killing innocent lives to condemning one of the foremost Muslim scholars, Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Many of Zawahri’s questioners asked why al Qaeda is waging attacks on Muslims and in Muslim lands, rather than on Israel. Zawahri answered one such question, saying, “We promise Muslim brothers that we will strive as much as we can to deal blows to the Jews inside Israel and outside it.”

You can read the transcript of the audio message here. Zawahiri is asked many questions as to why more Muslims have been killed by Al-Qaeda than Jews, to which Bin Laden’s deputy responds with denial. He divides his questions into several parts, the first dealing with the murder of the innocent. AQ’s north African branches are brought up repeatedly, and responding to an attack on the U.N offices in Algiers, December 11th, which left at least 26 people dead, Zawahiri claimed that his mujahideen were far more reliable sources than the “lying sons of France.” His group, just in case you weren’t aware, has been active in Algeria. Here is the question and the beginning of its response:

2/1: The questioner Talib Jami’i Tib al-Jazaa’ir [University Student, Medicine,Algeria] says, “Al-Qaida Organization in the countries of the Islamic Maghreb: is killing women and children Jihad in your view? I want al-Zawahiri to answer me about those who kill the people in Algeria. What is the legal evidence for killing the innocents? The blood of sixty Muslims was spilled on the 11th of December in Algeria, and al-Qaida claims for itself an explosion in which Muslims who worship Allah (the Glorious and Great) alone died. There is no power nor strength except with Allah. So congratulations to the champion al-Zawahiri and Droukdel on the killing of the innocent students, children and women in this ‘Eid. What is the sin of the innocent? Allah suffices us and is the best of protectors against you.”

(Zawahiri’s responses in italics) My reply to Talib Jami’i Tib al-Jazaa’ir is the same as my reply to the previous questioner, but I add that those who were killed on the 11th of December in Algeria are not from the innocents. Rather, according to the communiqué from the brothers in al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, they are from the Crusader unbelievers and the government troops who defend them. Our brothers in al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb are more truthful, more just and more righteous than the lying sons of France who have sold Algeria to it and America, and who woo Israel in order for the head of the Crusade, America, to be pleased with them. These criminals who have attacked the Shari’ah and excluded it from government by force and rigging, and who have killed hundreds of thousands of innocent Muslims, and who help the Americans and their Crusader allies to kill millions of Muslims cannot possibly be truthful nor just.

The second group of questions focuses on Iran, although not much is necessarily answered. There was ample criticism of Hezballah and Hamas, excerpts of which follow:

On the Shiaa laity:

My response to the first question of Taalib al-Du’aa is that my stance towards the Shi’ite laity is the stance of the men of knowledge of the people of the Sunnah, which is that they are excused through their ignorance. As for those who participated with their leaders in cooperating with the Crusader and attacking the Muslims, their status in that case is that of the groups refraining from the laws of Islam. As for their laity who haven’t
participated in aggression against the Muslims, and didn’t fight under the standard of the global Crusade, our way with them is invitation and displaying of facts, and clarifying the extent of the crimes committed by their leaders against Islam and Muslims, and how they cooperated with the Crusaders in the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, and how they claim to defend the People of the House [of the Prophet] but when they fought each other, they destroyed the two domes of al-Husayn and al-Abbas (with both of whom Allah was pleased), and how they claim that their goal is the liberation of Palestine, but Hassan Nasrullah welcomes the international Crusader forces which occupied Lebanon and came between its people and the Jihad in Palestine, and Rafsanjani states that we don’t aim to remove Israel, and Iran is a member of the United Nations with Israel, and the United Nations charter obligates all members to respect the unity and safety of the other members territories and sovereignty.

And on his criticism of Hamas by audio tape:

Why do you intentionally direct sharply-worded advice to HAMAS through audio recordings? The one who is keen on Islamic unity and the supreme interest seeks other methods of offering advice and understanding the other’s stance by way of channels of dialogue, not media channels.

I warn my brothers the Muslims in Palestine and outside it from an orientation spreading amongst the leaderships of a well-known Islamic group and among political leaderships affiliated with Islamic activism in  Palestine, [an orientation] which calls for setting up a Palestinian state on the parts of Palestine which were occupied after 1967 and forgetting the parts of Palestine which were stolen before that. The mask fell away from this orientation in the Makkah accord which gave up four-fifths of Palestine, and al- Qardawi – as is clear from his words – supports this orientation.
Thus, the Muslim Ummah in Palestine and everywhere must be extremely wary of that orientation and confront it with strength and resolve. As for her second question regarding the criticism of HAMAS, I would like to bring three things to the attention of the noble sister:
The first is that I took a gradual approach with HAMAS, from support to repeated advice to warning to general criticism, but when they signed the Makkah accord, frank criticism was a must. I took a gradual approach with them, but they didn’t heed the opinion of their brothers and continued in what they had plunged into, from their entering the elections in compliance with the secular constitutions to their abandonment of their brothers in Chechnya and finishing up with their abandonment of four-fifths of Palestine in Makkah.
The second is that I always differentiated in my messages between the political leaders of HAMAS and the Mujahideen of HAMAS and the rest of the Mujahideen in Palestine. I  riticized the leaders of HAMAS and will continue to criticize them as long as they adhere to the secular Palestinian constitution and as long as they don’t declare their abandonment of the Makkah accord. As for the Mujahideen of HAMAS and the rest of
the Mujahideen in Palestine, I supported them and continue to support them, and I call on the Ummah to aid them, especially the tribes of the Sinai. Some criticized me as acting aimlessly, one time offering my condolences to the Ummah on HAMAS and another time requesting support for it, but this is not fair, for my
words are clear, public and on tape. I offered my condolences to the Ummah – and continue to offer my condolences to it – on the political leadership of HAMAS, and I requested the Ummah – and continue to request it – to aid all the Mujahideen in Palestine, including the Mujahideen of HAMAS.

He does make it clear that he in no way regards Hamas and Fatah as equals:

I don’t agree with those who make HAMAS and Fatah equals. HAMAS is a movement which stresses its affiliation with Islam, whereas Fatah is a secular movement. And I don’t agree with declaring HAMAS’s leaders to be unbelievers. Declaring individuals to be unbelievers is a serious matter in which there must be the presence of prerequisites and the absence of impediments. So I advise my brothers to abandon this issue and focus on supporting HAMAS if it is correct and criticizing it if it errors in a fair, scientific, invitational way.

The third set of questions deal primarily with Egypt. Al-Zawahiri is asked about the renunciation of violence last year by 135 members of his former group Al-Jihad, to which he replies that the organization he belonged to has since joined AQ and adds that they never renounced a thing:

al-Jihad Organization is a generic name. If, however, you mean the al-Jihad Group which I was honored to belong to, then it has not recanted – by the grace of Allah – for two reasons: the first is that it united with al-Qaida Group in the group Qaida al- Jihad, and the second is that those who have compromised are a man  who left the group, and not just that, but left the path of Jihad entirely approximately 15 years ago, along
with a group of prisoners, some of whom used to be members in the group, others of whom split with it, and  still others who never joined it in the first place. As for the Group, it hasn’t recanted: on the contrary, its leadership and the vast majority of its captives continue – by the grace of Allah – to be resolute on the truth. And the government media uses description without any truth to it, like “al-Qaida’s mufti,” “Amir of Egyptian
Islamic Jihad,” and “Taliban’s military advisor.”

He goes on to talk about his family in Egypt, the possibility of a branch of Al-Qaeda opening in his home country (in response to someone eager to “join the caravan”), and declares the State Security, which routinely investigates and detains Islamists, to be fair game. Questions on Lebanon, Iran’s conflict with America, and more on Zawahiri’s views of other Islamist groups round up the transcript, with a final note concluding “the first installment.”

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