mubarak-kefaya.jpgI highlighted a report on the Muslim Brotherhood earlier in the day; here’s one from Amr Hamzawy and Mohammed Herzallah of the Carnegie Endowment on the recent local elections in Egypt nearly a week and a half ago. The argument here is basically that these elections signify a backward trend of political progress in the country. The authors point to a reversion of behavior by the regime to its more autocratic methods of political practice in this recent election cycle, as well as the issue of inflation and unemployment which have been plaguing the country (recently Western media sources have been covering what is being referred to as the “Bread Crisis“, and similar effects around the world).

The authors then tackle the issue of the MB’s decision to boycott the April 8th elections, which came the day before and was issued in the face of a familiar series of crackdowns on the group from the government. The government had imprisoned nearly 1,000 Brotherhood members and the majority of candidates which the group had planned to field, placing the decision to boycott in an understandable context. Hamzawy and Herzallah argue, however, that this decision by the Brotherhood should call into question whether the country indeed has a legitimate opposition group which is capable of advancing an agenda of political freedom and reform. An excerpt from that section of the report follows:

Notwithstanding the regime’s intransigence and its violations of the law, the irregular attitude with which the Muslim Brotherhood approached the local election crisis stands in conspicuous contrast to the consistent participatory approach to which it had committed earlier. In an interview conducted in late February, a few days after the Brotherhood announced that it would
participate in the local elections, Muhammed Habib, the first deputy of the General Guide, outlined the chief reasons behind his movement’s commitment to participation in the April local elections despite all the restrictions. He emphasized preserving an active channel of communication with the public to exchange ideas and programs, underscoring the movement’s commitment to peaceful reform, keeping the public space in a dynamic condition in the face
of continued undemocratic pressures, maintaining a positive public atmosphere, and sustaining vigor and debate within the Brotherhood’s ranks.

Various statements made by the Muslim Brotherhood expressed similar sentiments and stressed that the Brotherhood’s cause is legitimate and protected by the Egyptian constitution. On the whole, the fact that the movement was determined to run in the elections was not in question. Indeed, participation at all costs offered the Brotherhood a valuable opportunity to challenge the regime’s power and demonstrate its ability to remain a vital force in Egyptian politics. In an interview on April 5, Mahmoud Izzat, a member in the Brotherhood’s Guidance Bureau, stated that the movement would not boycott the elections regardless of what happened.7 The fact that
Izzat made this statement two days before the Brotherhood announced its boycott of the elections indicated that the final decision had been made hastily and had not been subjected to extensive internal deliberations.

To the degree that the movement intended to retaliate for the regime’s flagrant actions, its decision may not pay off. After all, keeping the Muslim Brotherhood out of the local councils was the intention of the ruling establishment in the first place. What’s more, the movement is setting a dangerous precedent that the regime will certainly keep in mind: through sufficient political persecution and repression, the authorities can count on the Brotherhood to take itself voluntarily out the political equation.

You can find the full report here.

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