Michael Slackman is one of the better journalists covering Egypt.  He manages to capture some of the absurd realities which make Cairo one the most fascinating cities in the world, and his latest article in the NYT delves into the abundance of noise which is characteristic of the city:

While noise is never cited as a reason for the spasms of violence, it is a silent enemy that makes the pressures of life that much harder to cope with, people on the streets here said.

“The noise bothers me, and I know it bothers people,” said Abdel Khaleq, driver of a battered black and white taxi as he paused from honking his horn to stop for passengers.

“So why do you do it?” he was asked.

“Well, to tell you I’m here,” he said. “There is no such thing as logic in this country.”

And then he drove off, honking.

mubarak-kefaya.jpgI highlighted a report on the Muslim Brotherhood earlier in the day; here’s one from Amr Hamzawy and Mohammed Herzallah of the Carnegie Endowment on the recent local elections in Egypt nearly a week and a half ago. The argument here is basically that these elections signify a backward trend of political progress in the country. The authors point to a reversion of behavior by the regime to its more autocratic methods of political practice in this recent election cycle, as well as the issue of inflation and unemployment which have been plaguing the country (recently Western media sources have been covering what is being referred to as the “Bread Crisis“, and similar effects around the world).

The authors then tackle the issue of the MB’s decision to boycott the April 8th elections, which came the day before and was issued in the face of a familiar series of crackdowns on the group from the government. The government had imprisoned nearly 1,000 Brotherhood members and the majority of candidates which the group had planned to field, placing the decision to boycott in an understandable context. Hamzawy and Herzallah argue, however, that this decision by the Brotherhood should call into question whether the country indeed has a legitimate opposition group which is capable of advancing an agenda of political freedom and reform. An excerpt from that section of the report follows:

Notwithstanding the regime’s intransigence and its violations of the law, the irregular attitude with which the Muslim Brotherhood approached the local election crisis stands in conspicuous contrast to the consistent participatory approach to which it had committed earlier. In an interview conducted in late February, a few days after the Brotherhood announced that it would
participate in the local elections, Muhammed Habib, the first deputy of the General Guide, outlined the chief reasons behind his movement’s commitment to participation in the April local elections despite all the restrictions. He emphasized preserving an active channel of communication with the public to exchange ideas and programs, underscoring the movement’s commitment to peaceful reform, keeping the public space in a dynamic condition in the face
of continued undemocratic pressures, maintaining a positive public atmosphere, and sustaining vigor and debate within the Brotherhood’s ranks.

Various statements made by the Muslim Brotherhood expressed similar sentiments and stressed that the Brotherhood’s cause is legitimate and protected by the Egyptian constitution. On the whole, the fact that the movement was determined to run in the elections was not in question. Indeed, participation at all costs offered the Brotherhood a valuable opportunity to challenge the regime’s power and demonstrate its ability to remain a vital force in Egyptian politics. In an interview on April 5, Mahmoud Izzat, a member in the Brotherhood’s Guidance Bureau, stated that the movement would not boycott the elections regardless of what happened.7 The fact that
Izzat made this statement two days before the Brotherhood announced its boycott of the elections indicated that the final decision had been made hastily and had not been subjected to extensive internal deliberations.

To the degree that the movement intended to retaliate for the regime’s flagrant actions, its decision may not pay off. After all, keeping the Muslim Brotherhood out of the local councils was the intention of the ruling establishment in the first place. What’s more, the movement is setting a dangerous precedent that the regime will certainly keep in mind: through sufficient political persecution and repression, the authorities can count on the Brotherhood to take itself voluntarily out the political equation.

You can find the full report here.

64000686_0ef04c4ef6_o.jpgIn keeping with a similar theme to a previous post of mine (in response to a post at FPWatch), I thought this report by Joshua Stacher was worth a small write-up.  Some may remember his article published last year in the Boston Globe along with Samer Shahata arguing that in light of the Brotherhood’s electoral successes, a policy of engagement is warranted.The attitudes towards the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in the West are beginning to change, and despite some long-held reservations about the group Western governments seem to be opening up to the idea of responsible engagement with a major Islamist force in the region. 

While I generally have little problem with the notion of talking to the Muslim Brotherhood, a change from the current prevailing policy of non-engagement would not come without its share of implications.  Firstly, as Stacher makes note of in his report, there are many ‘grey areas’ surrounding the MB.  These include “political pluralism,the use of violence, the principles of equal citizenship and universal human rights, and the relationship between religion and state.” Yet with this acknowledgement two policy recommendations are made concerning the relationship of Western governments towards the MB. What I find laudable about these recommendations is that they are presented in the context of the Egyptian political landscape as a whole. While I can’t find the paper to link to right now, I have argued in the past that while increased engagement of the countries’ theocrats is warranted, it should not come at the expense of Egypt’s other political factions, no matter how ineffective they have proven to be. In other words, the West should not embolden the theocrats at the expense of the democrats in the country, who equally have not been given a fair playing field to run their political activities. Stacher presents his recommendations in this context, one which I think is missing at times in other analyses of Western policy towards the MB.

The two recommendations are essentially that the West should increase its pressure on the Egyptian government for political reform which would allow for plurality in the system, while increasing efforts to open up channels of communication between the country’s opposition parties, including the MB. According to the executive summary, a future report is in the works which will highlight some of the more critical aspects of these policy recommendations and their implications. 

I am no fan of the Brotherhood, and will continue to have my reservations against the group.  However a broader policy of communication with both the theocrats and democrats of Egypt’s political opposition, with care taken not to promote any particular group and stimulate the freedom political activity in the country, would be in the interest of the country as a whole.

You can download the entire report here.

Update: Here is a previous post of mine over at MidEastYouth, in which I expressed some of my reservations towards the Muslim Brotherhood’s position as Egypt’s political opposition, with an important quote from Saad Eddin Ibrahim.  I was arguing for an empowerment of the ’silent majority’ Ibrahim speaks of through conditional U.S aid to Egypt:

The fact of the matter is Egypt, and the regime ruling it is extremly dependant on U.S support, which they have maintained through the illusion of the Muslim Brotherhood as the main political opposition. Secular parties are banned from forming or even gathering, charged with fabricated accusations of crime and effectively marginalised, yet to much less media fanfare than news of Brotherhood members being arrested. This is not unintentional, and as democracy activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim said in a recent interview (asked about the Brotherhood being the largest opposition group link:

We could not organize rallies, we could not organize marches or demonstrations because of emergency laws. Emergency laws have been in effect since 1981, since the assassination of President [Anwar] Sadat. So for the last 26 years, these emergency laws have prevented secularists from going out and organizing and mobilizing.

On the other hand, the Muslim Brothers have the mosques, and that is an advantage that is without design probably by the regime, but it has played in their favor. Meanwhile, I do not like to exaggerate their constituency because despite the fact that they have freer space to move in, still their share in the last Egyptian parliamentary election was 20 percent out of the 20 percent [of registered voters who actually voted]. So, 77 percent of the registered voters did not like to vote for them, nor to vote for the regime. And that is a 77 percent that I consider to be the silent majority, the potential constituency for liberal-democratic parties whenever liberal-democratic parties are allowed full freedom to operate.

A recording released on Islamist sites yesterday featured Ayman Al-Zawahiri answering questions from followers and Al Zawahirionline Islamic forum readers. The offer to take questions had been posed in December, and the response seems to have been overwhelming:

The questions were posted in response to Ayman al Zawahri’s December solicitation for online questions from “friendly or hostile” individuals and organizations with the promise that they would be answered one month later.

Zawahri’s almost two-hour-long audio message addresses everything from killing innocent lives to condemning one of the foremost Muslim scholars, Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Many of Zawahri’s questioners asked why al Qaeda is waging attacks on Muslims and in Muslim lands, rather than on Israel. Zawahri answered one such question, saying, “We promise Muslim brothers that we will strive as much as we can to deal blows to the Jews inside Israel and outside it.”

You can read the transcript of the audio message here. Zawahiri is asked many questions as to why more Muslims have been killed by Al-Qaeda than Jews, to which Bin Laden’s deputy responds with denial. He divides his questions into several parts, the first dealing with the murder of the innocent. AQ’s north African branches are brought up repeatedly, and responding to an attack on the U.N offices in Algiers, December 11th, which left at least 26 people dead, Zawahiri claimed that his mujahideen were far more reliable sources than the “lying sons of France.” His group, just in case you weren’t aware, has been active in Algeria. Here is the question and the beginning of its response:

2/1: The questioner Talib Jami’i Tib al-Jazaa’ir [University Student, Medicine,Algeria] says, “Al-Qaida Organization in the countries of the Islamic Maghreb: is killing women and children Jihad in your view? I want al-Zawahiri to answer me about those who kill the people in Algeria. What is the legal evidence for killing the innocents? The blood of sixty Muslims was spilled on the 11th of December in Algeria, and al-Qaida claims for itself an explosion in which Muslims who worship Allah (the Glorious and Great) alone died. There is no power nor strength except with Allah. So congratulations to the champion al-Zawahiri and Droukdel on the killing of the innocent students, children and women in this ‘Eid. What is the sin of the innocent? Allah suffices us and is the best of protectors against you.”

(Zawahiri’s responses in italics) My reply to Talib Jami’i Tib al-Jazaa’ir is the same as my reply to the previous questioner, but I add that those who were killed on the 11th of December in Algeria are not from the innocents. Rather, according to the communiqué from the brothers in al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, they are from the Crusader unbelievers and the government troops who defend them. Our brothers in al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb are more truthful, more just and more righteous than the lying sons of France who have sold Algeria to it and America, and who woo Israel in order for the head of the Crusade, America, to be pleased with them. These criminals who have attacked the Shari’ah and excluded it from government by force and rigging, and who have killed hundreds of thousands of innocent Muslims, and who help the Americans and their Crusader allies to kill millions of Muslims cannot possibly be truthful nor just.

The second group of questions focuses on Iran, although not much is necessarily answered. There was ample criticism of Hezballah and Hamas, excerpts of which follow:

On the Shiaa laity:

My response to the first question of Taalib al-Du’aa is that my stance towards the Shi’ite laity is the stance of the men of knowledge of the people of the Sunnah, which is that they are excused through their ignorance. As for those who participated with their leaders in cooperating with the Crusader and attacking the Muslims, their status in that case is that of the groups refraining from the laws of Islam. As for their laity who haven’t
participated in aggression against the Muslims, and didn’t fight under the standard of the global Crusade, our way with them is invitation and displaying of facts, and clarifying the extent of the crimes committed by their leaders against Islam and Muslims, and how they cooperated with the Crusaders in the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, and how they claim to defend the People of the House [of the Prophet] but when they fought each other, they destroyed the two domes of al-Husayn and al-Abbas (with both of whom Allah was pleased), and how they claim that their goal is the liberation of Palestine, but Hassan Nasrullah welcomes the international Crusader forces which occupied Lebanon and came between its people and the Jihad in Palestine, and Rafsanjani states that we don’t aim to remove Israel, and Iran is a member of the United Nations with Israel, and the United Nations charter obligates all members to respect the unity and safety of the other members territories and sovereignty.

And on his criticism of Hamas by audio tape:

Why do you intentionally direct sharply-worded advice to HAMAS through audio recordings? The one who is keen on Islamic unity and the supreme interest seeks other methods of offering advice and understanding the other’s stance by way of channels of dialogue, not media channels.

I warn my brothers the Muslims in Palestine and outside it from an orientation spreading amongst the leaderships of a well-known Islamic group and among political leaderships affiliated with Islamic activism in  Palestine, [an orientation] which calls for setting up a Palestinian state on the parts of Palestine which were occupied after 1967 and forgetting the parts of Palestine which were stolen before that. The mask fell away from this orientation in the Makkah accord which gave up four-fifths of Palestine, and al- Qardawi – as is clear from his words – supports this orientation.
Thus, the Muslim Ummah in Palestine and everywhere must be extremely wary of that orientation and confront it with strength and resolve. As for her second question regarding the criticism of HAMAS, I would like to bring three things to the attention of the noble sister:
The first is that I took a gradual approach with HAMAS, from support to repeated advice to warning to general criticism, but when they signed the Makkah accord, frank criticism was a must. I took a gradual approach with them, but they didn’t heed the opinion of their brothers and continued in what they had plunged into, from their entering the elections in compliance with the secular constitutions to their abandonment of their brothers in Chechnya and finishing up with their abandonment of four-fifths of Palestine in Makkah.
The second is that I always differentiated in my messages between the political leaders of HAMAS and the Mujahideen of HAMAS and the rest of the Mujahideen in Palestine. I  riticized the leaders of HAMAS and will continue to criticize them as long as they adhere to the secular Palestinian constitution and as long as they don’t declare their abandonment of the Makkah accord. As for the Mujahideen of HAMAS and the rest of
the Mujahideen in Palestine, I supported them and continue to support them, and I call on the Ummah to aid them, especially the tribes of the Sinai. Some criticized me as acting aimlessly, one time offering my condolences to the Ummah on HAMAS and another time requesting support for it, but this is not fair, for my
words are clear, public and on tape. I offered my condolences to the Ummah – and continue to offer my condolences to it – on the political leadership of HAMAS, and I requested the Ummah – and continue to request it – to aid all the Mujahideen in Palestine, including the Mujahideen of HAMAS.

He does make it clear that he in no way regards Hamas and Fatah as equals:

I don’t agree with those who make HAMAS and Fatah equals. HAMAS is a movement which stresses its affiliation with Islam, whereas Fatah is a secular movement. And I don’t agree with declaring HAMAS’s leaders to be unbelievers. Declaring individuals to be unbelievers is a serious matter in which there must be the presence of prerequisites and the absence of impediments. So I advise my brothers to abandon this issue and focus on supporting HAMAS if it is correct and criticizing it if it errors in a fair, scientific, invitational way.

The third set of questions deal primarily with Egypt. Al-Zawahiri is asked about the renunciation of violence last year by 135 members of his former group Al-Jihad, to which he replies that the organization he belonged to has since joined AQ and adds that they never renounced a thing:

al-Jihad Organization is a generic name. If, however, you mean the al-Jihad Group which I was honored to belong to, then it has not recanted – by the grace of Allah – for two reasons: the first is that it united with al-Qaida Group in the group Qaida al- Jihad, and the second is that those who have compromised are a man  who left the group, and not just that, but left the path of Jihad entirely approximately 15 years ago, along
with a group of prisoners, some of whom used to be members in the group, others of whom split with it, and  still others who never joined it in the first place. As for the Group, it hasn’t recanted: on the contrary, its leadership and the vast majority of its captives continue – by the grace of Allah – to be resolute on the truth. And the government media uses description without any truth to it, like “al-Qaida’s mufti,” “Amir of Egyptian
Islamic Jihad,” and “Taliban’s military advisor.”

He goes on to talk about his family in Egypt, the possibility of a branch of Al-Qaeda opening in his home country (in response to someone eager to “join the caravan”), and declares the State Security, which routinely investigates and detains Islamists, to be fair game. Questions on Lebanon, Iran’s conflict with America, and more on Zawahiri’s views of other Islamist groups round up the transcript, with a final note concluding “the first installment.”

Egypt’s ambassador to Britain is apparently lobbying hard to make his country Gordon Brown’s next vacation spot. The North African country attracted more than one head of state last December, and Prime Minister Brown may be set to join the club:

Gehad Madi, the ambassador for Egypt, to where the Blairs repair each winter, tells Mandrake that he has made it his mission to encourage Brown to change his ways.

“He hasn’t had a proper holiday since becoming Prime Minister,” His Excellency told me at the launch of Rowan Somerville’s novel The End of Sleep, at the Egyptian embassy in Mayfair. “We would like him to go to Egypt.”

To this end, Madi’s wife, Mona, has made contact with Sarah Brown.

“I recently took Sarah and her boys to the Tutankhamun exhibition [in Greenwich],” she said, “She was very, very interested; she particularly wanted her boys to understand the history of it. We would be happy to arrange a holiday for the Browns in Egypt.”

Egypt BreadReports of new clashes in the increasingly long Egyptian breadlines are coming in today. According to a police source cited in the linked report, 7 people have died. Among those deaths, two have been a result of stabbings. Last week’s demand by the President to produce more bread has led to the opening of 10 additional large bakeries and distribution kiosks, as well as an effort to purchase more wheat:

The state-owned Al-Ahram newspaper said Mubarak’s order to the armed forces to intervene “means that he has declared an emergency state to combat this crisis.” Another columnist in the paper called the bread riots “a very critical moment” for Egypt, demonstrating the gap between rich and poor.

Some fear the crisis could mirror riots in 1977 that killed at least 70 people after the government hiked the price of bread and other subsidized foods.

Egypt grows about half of the more than 14 million tons of wheat it consumes every year. It has also long been one of the top importers of U.S. wheat, using about $54 million of some $2 billion a year in U.S. aid to buy it. But its U.S. purchases have been falling as it searches for cheaper sellers on the world market, where prices have tripled in the last 10 months.

Mubarak has ordered the government to use foreign currency reserves to buy additional wheat, according to his spokesman Suleiman Awad.

The government also will add 15 million new names to the list of those receiving cheap rations of cooking oil, sugar and rice. That and other measures will increase the government’s annual food subsidy costs by $3.1 billion to a total of $13.7 billion this year.

None of that has given much relief to citizens, many of whom already are disgruntled with Mubarak’s government because of its long hold on power, and its favoritism and corruption.

“I’ve been standing here for hours, and we are not close to getting bread yet,” said Mohammed el-Deeb, a manager at medical company. “Of course I need to stand in the line, I can’t afford the other bread.”

Shortages in bread, caused both by growing inflation as well as rising wheat prices on international markets, have been the source of social unrest in the Middle East’s most populous nation.  President Mubarak has, according to an official spokesman, instructed the Army to produce more bread with the aim of stopping the shortages. 

The increase in prices as well as the shortages for subsidized bread has caused concern that a repeat of 1977’s bread riots looms on the horizon.  According to a spokesman for the World Food Programme, Egypt’s predicament stems from a series of international factors of economy and agriculture:

This has emerged from a number of factors, including the rise in oil and energy prices, the economic boom in nations like India and China which is increasing demand, climate and weather-related events such as droughts and floods, and competition between food and fuel, where more land and agricultural crops are being used for bio-fuels than for food.

The rise in commodities and wheat has made unsubsidized bread unaffordable for a large portion of the Egyptian population.

The poor people are the most vulnerable to price pressures, as nearly a fifth of the country’s population is living below the lower poverty line on less than one dollar a day, Kandil said.

However, they are not the only ones to feel the heat of the crisis.

“We’re seeing middle income classes getting sucked into it,” Kandil said. “The salary increases are not rising sufficiently to cope with the price increases.”

“Egypt is feeling the impact of rising food prices even more because it imports a significant amount of its food requirements - including 12 million metric tons of cereals - annually. This is putting a lot of pressure on prices of commodities and utilities,” he added

Here is a video from AlJazeera English, reporting the story and showing scenes of chaos at Egyptian bread lines:

As outcry over the yet to be released film “Fitna” rages on, Egypt has taken a prominent position among the films detractors, threatening to impose what would have been the first concrete castigatory measure taken against the Netherlands. Organizers of Cairo’s international children’s film festival, issued a statement indicating their intent to ban any entries from both Dutch and Danish film makers. The latter nation earned its ban, according to reports, because of the continuing cartoon saga which has come to be emblematic of wasted time and the weakening sensitivity of a religious identity. No Danish films have been entered into the contest, making the ban little more than symbolic.

The ban, however, was lifted by the festival following what its organizers called an “apology” by the Dutch Prime Minister during a recent press conference:

“After the apology of the (Dutch) cabinet … the committee agreed in less than a minute to take the film back into the festival,” Naem al-Baz of the Cairo International Film Festival for Children told AFP.

The “apology” in reference turns out to be no such thing.  In a press conference over the weekend, Prime Minister Balkenede sought to distance himself and his cabinet from the film, sighting his concerns about the safety of Dutch “citizens, soldiers, and companies” in the aftermath of the movie’s release:

“It is our responsibility to make clear to everyone that the views and actions of this one elected representative are not those of the government,” Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende told reporters last week. “We defend the core values of freedom and respect. We guarantee freedom of expression and of religion, for Muslims as for everyone else.”

Meanwhile, NATO has also issued a statement of concern over the potential impact the movie may have on its’ troops.

Geert WildersDutch MP Geert Wilders, head of the PVV (Party for Freedom), has angered many self-interested religious leaders and foreign state officials with a movie critical of Islam, weeks before it has even been released. If you don’t know about this yet read up on it now, because the likelihood of an international wave of riots “protests”, a la last years’ cartoons, could very well be on the horizon:

“It is regrettable that European lawmakers and politicians use gratuitous methods to gain electoral votes by attacking the sacred values and religions of others,” foreign ministry spokesman Hossam Zaki said in a statement.

Dutch far-right deputy Geert Wilders has said he will be airing on television in the Netherlands in March a controversial anti-Islam film called “Fitna” (Ordeal), which accuses the Quran of inciting people to murder.

Such politicians, Zaki said in reference to Wilders, “focus their hatred on Islam” and plan to broadcast a film undermining Islamic symbols.

These acts “feed hatred against Muslims and encourage extremism and confrontation instead of opting for dialogue based on mutual respect,” Zaki said.

This month Egypt banned the sale of four European newspapers for reprinting the Prophet pictures and summoned the ambassador of Denmark.

Now, I don’t think this movie will be of any intellectual value. And I have similar sentiments towards the man behind the film, but at the end of the day it’s one movie that will broadcast on Dutch television. Why is the Egyptian foreign ministry speaking out about this, before the movie has even been aired?

Mr. Zaki is partially correct in his statement about actions which feed hatred against Muslims and encourage extremism, albeit not for the acts his statements were made against. The reaction to every single anti-Islamic or Middle Eastern sentiment expressed in Europe by Arab (and Persian) government officials, as if to imply that people of that continent should censor themselves so as to never offend Muslims, has played a large role in fanning the flames of the reactionary “protests” we see around the world. Hopefully the Dutch government will do the right thing once the movie is released and respond firmly in support of free speech to any of the patronizing formal protests which will undoubtedly be hurled their way.

Following an encouraging verdict earlier this month involving a case of police torture, 3 Egyptian police personnel were sentenced on Tuesday to 7 years  of prison each, with the fourth one handed a 3 year sentence.  It does suggest an encouraging trend, if you can call it that.  But essentially it’s a sign of judicial progress and a result of broader awareness being raised on the issue:

The four police personnel were sentenced by the criminal court in the northern Nile Delta town of Mansoura late on Tuesday after a hearing lasting more than 10 hours.

The men were convicted of beating a carpenter, Nasr Abdullah, to death in July by banging his head against the wall in order to extract information about the location of his brother, a suspect in a drugs case.

Mr Abdullah’s death provoked angry demonstrations by local people.

“This is the longest sentence heard of in the last 10 years,” Gasser Abdel-Razek of the US-based organisation Human Rights Watch told the Associated Press.

“This one is very interesting.”

But Mr Abdel-Razek warned that the sentence was most likely the result of an activist judge rather a change in the government’s stance on police brutality.

“This is the judiciary - it’s not the government. If the government wants to get tougher on this it should start by amending the legislation to conform to international law,” he added.

In another recent case in Mansoura, a judicial investigation cleared a policeman who had questioned a 13-year-old boy who died shortly after spending several days in custody on suspicion of stealing packets of tea.

Really? Packets of tea? Tea is subsidised in Egypt and dirt cheap, why would a 13 year-old boy be held on such silly charges?

Does anyone know where to find the original story behind this?

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