There’s an article in the NYT today in which American interrogators have issued a report to the Iraqi government claiming that Hezballah has been training Iraqi militias inside Iran. This information is said to have come from interrogations of four Shiite militia members detained late last year, yet the report raises more questions than it does to address concerns of Iranian involvement in Iraq. As the article notes, this is not a fresh accusation by any means, and similar reports have been published by the Times itself. From today’s report:

There has been debate among experts about the extent to which Iran is responsible for instability in Iraq. But President Bush and other American officials, in public castigations of Iran, have said that Iran has been consistently meddlesome in Iraq and that the Iranians have long sought to arm and train Iraqi militias, which the American military has called “special groups.”

In a possible effort to be less obtrusive, it appears that Iran is now bringing small groups of Iraqi Shiite militants to camps in Iran, where they are taught how to do their own training, American officials say.

The militants then return to Iraq to teach comrades how to fire rockets and mortars, fight as snipers or assemble explosively formed penetrators, a particularly lethal type of roadside bomb made of Iranian components, according to American officials. The officials describe this approach as “training the trainers.”

The training, the Americans say, is carried out at several camps near Tehran that are overseen by the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Command, and the instruction is carried out by militants from Hezbollah, which has long been supported by the Quds Force. American officials say the Hezbollah militants perform several important roles for the Iranians.

To some, this is just another piece of evidence of Iranian meddling in Iraqi affairs. If you continue reading the article, it goes on to list some of the roles Hezballah plays for the Iranians, such as allowing Arabs to be trained by other Arabs, apparently facilitating some level of trust. However, Iran’s involvement in Iraq has been long known, and the roles it has played in training, arming, and financing militias has always been suspect. I read this report in a different context.

Hezballah, an illegal militia created and funded by foreigners, has not only been able to dwarf Lebanon’s armed forces in power and capability, but is making a run to position itself as the legitimate coercive force of the country. It has had the capacity to start and fight a war on behalf of its country, with no input from the elected government, and now “controls” significant areas of Lebanon to which it allows and denies access, even to the nation’s army. The training of foreign fighters by Hezballah only underscores the point that the battle for Lebanese sovereignty is a primary issue in dealing with the creeping Iranian hegemony in the region. This issue should not be perceived as secondary to Iran’s nuclear development or their standoff with the West, but is in fact critical to the resolution of these issues. Any discussions with Iran should place Iran’s interference in Lebanese affairs as a priority.

Gaza Hamas DemonstrationAn issue of much deliberation in the blogosphere lately has been the initiation of negotiations with Hamas. Former U.S President Jimmy Carter has recently made his intentions known, once again, that he’d favor meeting with the Palestinian group in light of the increasing failure of the current American policy of isolation. Barack Obama has issued a weak statement in opposition to the proposed meeting between Carter and Khaled Meshaal in Syria next week, citing Hamas’ refusal to recognize Israel and its status as a terrorist organization as his reasons. A recent post by Jeb Koogler over at FPWatch, a blog which I’d highly recommend for daily reading, takes umbrage at the presidential candidate’s statement and expresses disappointment at a lack of courage in Obama’s position to speak out against the Bush administration’s failing policy of isolation and containment. I found myself responding to this post by debating out loud the words displayed on my computer screen, not necessarily in disagreement with Jeb but with an interest to examine the implications of Carter’s meeting.

First, allow me to address the issue of Barack Obama in this discussion. While the consensus is that his response has been politically calculated, it was also weak at best and may serve to put some of his other positions into perspective. If a precondition for negotiation is the recognition of Israel, then U.S allies such as Saudi Arabia should accordingly be treated differently with regards to foreign policy. The current president has met with many heads of state whom have yet to recognize Israel. If the same conditions posed for a meeting with Hamas are applied to Iran, whose president Obama has indicated he is willing to meet with, his proposal suffers similar scrutiny. My take on Obama’s position towards meeting with America’s adversaries was that it was rooted in a moral and logical conviction, one which I was impressed by because of his perceived candor. His promised break from the failed policies of the past was refreshing, albeit slightly disconcerting if only for the inability to predict the implications of an alternative policy. Yet in light of his position towards Carter’s visit, Jeb’s expressed sentiment of disappointment is one I share.

However another aspect of this discussion which is conducive to disappointment has been the lack of mention of the metrics with which success of such a policy will be measured. In the same way the current policy of isolation and the insistence on preconditions for negotiations have had no historical precedent, the engagement of an Islamist group by the West with aim to push it towards moderacy has no precedent either. Therefore the advocacy of negotiations should not be cast as a solution to the crisis, but as a step towards eradicating a mentality which has caused such policy predicaments.

Looking solely at Carter’s visit though, I am tempted to declare that the reaction it is receiving from pundits and bloggers has been much ado about nothing. While providing the potential for a serious debate on the implications of such a policy, should it ever be officially adopted, the ensuing reaction has failed to deliver. For starters, a visit by Jimmy Carter will not realistically achieve anything significant, other than perhaps to attract a fair share of media coverage. I have not yet read what it is his visit is aiming to accomplish. Reports suggest “that the discussions will cover the issues of truce, prisoner swap and Palestinian reconciliation.” The Saudis and Egyptians have been negotiating these issues, with little success. The issues dividing the Palestinian factions are deeply nuanced. Carter will be attempting to accomplish what others have not been able to, and without any backing from an official body directly involved in the conflict.

And if it is not necessarily the intention of the former president to broker some sort of peace in the near future, his visit will be seen as an exercise of legitimizing Hamas in the eyes of the world. While one may argue that this is necessarily inevitable, given the support Hamas receives at home, without any significant change in U.S foreign policy this legitimization will only serve to anger allies who have been working within the realm of American policy to prescribe some sort of peace to the region. It could shift the moral authority in the way of Hamas, contrasting the U.S policy of isolation with its defiance by one of the country’s former leaders, and placing a measure of empathy on a group which has waged campaigns of terror in order to prevent peace in the past. It could potentially upset allies like Egypt, who will suffer from the parallel of increased engagement with Hamas with their treatment of the Muslim Brotherhood.

In principle, I am not an advocate of isolation and boycott. The United States should talk to some of its adversaries, given that there are predetermined goals which are to be reached, as well as a careful evaluation indicating the U.S would be able to realize those goals with engagement. And while I do not see the proposed trip by Carter as overly significant, I struggle to comprehend what the endeavor aims to accomplish. Unless an American administration declares its intentions to open a dialogue with Hamas, any visits by former officials will not only fail to solve the problems which exist in the Palestinian territories, but would add legitimacy to a group before the world is able to adjust its policies to handle the effects of that. Let us remember that there are significant moral arguments to be made against Hamas, and that the policy of isolation and boycott was not entirely misguided in its intent but rather its calculation and execution. It is time for a new policy towards Hamas, but it should not start with Jimmy Carter.

A recording released on Islamist sites yesterday featured Ayman Al-Zawahiri answering questions from followers and Al Zawahirionline Islamic forum readers. The offer to take questions had been posed in December, and the response seems to have been overwhelming:

The questions were posted in response to Ayman al Zawahri’s December solicitation for online questions from “friendly or hostile” individuals and organizations with the promise that they would be answered one month later.

Zawahri’s almost two-hour-long audio message addresses everything from killing innocent lives to condemning one of the foremost Muslim scholars, Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Many of Zawahri’s questioners asked why al Qaeda is waging attacks on Muslims and in Muslim lands, rather than on Israel. Zawahri answered one such question, saying, “We promise Muslim brothers that we will strive as much as we can to deal blows to the Jews inside Israel and outside it.”

You can read the transcript of the audio message here. Zawahiri is asked many questions as to why more Muslims have been killed by Al-Qaeda than Jews, to which Bin Laden’s deputy responds with denial. He divides his questions into several parts, the first dealing with the murder of the innocent. AQ’s north African branches are brought up repeatedly, and responding to an attack on the U.N offices in Algiers, December 11th, which left at least 26 people dead, Zawahiri claimed that his mujahideen were far more reliable sources than the “lying sons of France.” His group, just in case you weren’t aware, has been active in Algeria. Here is the question and the beginning of its response:

2/1: The questioner Talib Jami’i Tib al-Jazaa’ir [University Student, Medicine,Algeria] says, “Al-Qaida Organization in the countries of the Islamic Maghreb: is killing women and children Jihad in your view? I want al-Zawahiri to answer me about those who kill the people in Algeria. What is the legal evidence for killing the innocents? The blood of sixty Muslims was spilled on the 11th of December in Algeria, and al-Qaida claims for itself an explosion in which Muslims who worship Allah (the Glorious and Great) alone died. There is no power nor strength except with Allah. So congratulations to the champion al-Zawahiri and Droukdel on the killing of the innocent students, children and women in this ‘Eid. What is the sin of the innocent? Allah suffices us and is the best of protectors against you.”

(Zawahiri’s responses in italics) My reply to Talib Jami’i Tib al-Jazaa’ir is the same as my reply to the previous questioner, but I add that those who were killed on the 11th of December in Algeria are not from the innocents. Rather, according to the communiqué from the brothers in al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, they are from the Crusader unbelievers and the government troops who defend them. Our brothers in al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb are more truthful, more just and more righteous than the lying sons of France who have sold Algeria to it and America, and who woo Israel in order for the head of the Crusade, America, to be pleased with them. These criminals who have attacked the Shari’ah and excluded it from government by force and rigging, and who have killed hundreds of thousands of innocent Muslims, and who help the Americans and their Crusader allies to kill millions of Muslims cannot possibly be truthful nor just.

The second group of questions focuses on Iran, although not much is necessarily answered. There was ample criticism of Hezballah and Hamas, excerpts of which follow:

On the Shiaa laity:

My response to the first question of Taalib al-Du’aa is that my stance towards the Shi’ite laity is the stance of the men of knowledge of the people of the Sunnah, which is that they are excused through their ignorance. As for those who participated with their leaders in cooperating with the Crusader and attacking the Muslims, their status in that case is that of the groups refraining from the laws of Islam. As for their laity who haven’t
participated in aggression against the Muslims, and didn’t fight under the standard of the global Crusade, our way with them is invitation and displaying of facts, and clarifying the extent of the crimes committed by their leaders against Islam and Muslims, and how they cooperated with the Crusaders in the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, and how they claim to defend the People of the House [of the Prophet] but when they fought each other, they destroyed the two domes of al-Husayn and al-Abbas (with both of whom Allah was pleased), and how they claim that their goal is the liberation of Palestine, but Hassan Nasrullah welcomes the international Crusader forces which occupied Lebanon and came between its people and the Jihad in Palestine, and Rafsanjani states that we don’t aim to remove Israel, and Iran is a member of the United Nations with Israel, and the United Nations charter obligates all members to respect the unity and safety of the other members territories and sovereignty.

And on his criticism of Hamas by audio tape:

Why do you intentionally direct sharply-worded advice to HAMAS through audio recordings? The one who is keen on Islamic unity and the supreme interest seeks other methods of offering advice and understanding the other’s stance by way of channels of dialogue, not media channels.

I warn my brothers the Muslims in Palestine and outside it from an orientation spreading amongst the leaderships of a well-known Islamic group and among political leaderships affiliated with Islamic activism in  Palestine, [an orientation] which calls for setting up a Palestinian state on the parts of Palestine which were occupied after 1967 and forgetting the parts of Palestine which were stolen before that. The mask fell away from this orientation in the Makkah accord which gave up four-fifths of Palestine, and al- Qardawi – as is clear from his words – supports this orientation.
Thus, the Muslim Ummah in Palestine and everywhere must be extremely wary of that orientation and confront it with strength and resolve. As for her second question regarding the criticism of HAMAS, I would like to bring three things to the attention of the noble sister:
The first is that I took a gradual approach with HAMAS, from support to repeated advice to warning to general criticism, but when they signed the Makkah accord, frank criticism was a must. I took a gradual approach with them, but they didn’t heed the opinion of their brothers and continued in what they had plunged into, from their entering the elections in compliance with the secular constitutions to their abandonment of their brothers in Chechnya and finishing up with their abandonment of four-fifths of Palestine in Makkah.
The second is that I always differentiated in my messages between the political leaders of HAMAS and the Mujahideen of HAMAS and the rest of the Mujahideen in Palestine. I  riticized the leaders of HAMAS and will continue to criticize them as long as they adhere to the secular Palestinian constitution and as long as they don’t declare their abandonment of the Makkah accord. As for the Mujahideen of HAMAS and the rest of
the Mujahideen in Palestine, I supported them and continue to support them, and I call on the Ummah to aid them, especially the tribes of the Sinai. Some criticized me as acting aimlessly, one time offering my condolences to the Ummah on HAMAS and another time requesting support for it, but this is not fair, for my
words are clear, public and on tape. I offered my condolences to the Ummah – and continue to offer my condolences to it – on the political leadership of HAMAS, and I requested the Ummah – and continue to request it – to aid all the Mujahideen in Palestine, including the Mujahideen of HAMAS.

He does make it clear that he in no way regards Hamas and Fatah as equals:

I don’t agree with those who make HAMAS and Fatah equals. HAMAS is a movement which stresses its affiliation with Islam, whereas Fatah is a secular movement. And I don’t agree with declaring HAMAS’s leaders to be unbelievers. Declaring individuals to be unbelievers is a serious matter in which there must be the presence of prerequisites and the absence of impediments. So I advise my brothers to abandon this issue and focus on supporting HAMAS if it is correct and criticizing it if it errors in a fair, scientific, invitational way.

The third set of questions deal primarily with Egypt. Al-Zawahiri is asked about the renunciation of violence last year by 135 members of his former group Al-Jihad, to which he replies that the organization he belonged to has since joined AQ and adds that they never renounced a thing:

al-Jihad Organization is a generic name. If, however, you mean the al-Jihad Group which I was honored to belong to, then it has not recanted – by the grace of Allah – for two reasons: the first is that it united with al-Qaida Group in the group Qaida al- Jihad, and the second is that those who have compromised are a man  who left the group, and not just that, but left the path of Jihad entirely approximately 15 years ago, along
with a group of prisoners, some of whom used to be members in the group, others of whom split with it, and  still others who never joined it in the first place. As for the Group, it hasn’t recanted: on the contrary, its leadership and the vast majority of its captives continue – by the grace of Allah – to be resolute on the truth. And the government media uses description without any truth to it, like “al-Qaida’s mufti,” “Amir of Egyptian
Islamic Jihad,” and “Taliban’s military advisor.”

He goes on to talk about his family in Egypt, the possibility of a branch of Al-Qaeda opening in his home country (in response to someone eager to “join the caravan”), and declares the State Security, which routinely investigates and detains Islamists, to be fair game. Questions on Lebanon, Iran’s conflict with America, and more on Zawahiri’s views of other Islamist groups round up the transcript, with a final note concluding “the first installment.”

Israel still fears some form of retaliation from Hezballah in response to the assassination of Imad Mugniyeh, and a report in Haaretz suggests that a shuffle of Syrian forces on its borders may signal a coming attack from Nasrallah & co.  A more defensive military posture from Syria indicates an expectation that Israeli retaliation to any rocket attacks from Lebanon will be widespread and severe:

According to defense sources in Israel, the Syrians are preparing for the likelihood that Israel’s response to a Hezbollah attack will be severe and may result in a regional confrontation.

Senior political sources told Haaretz that Syria and Hezbollah are in close and constant coordination. They say that Hezbollah will not carry out an offensive operation against Israel without Syria being fully updated on the group’s plans.

In recent months the Syrian army has held a defensive posture on a fairly broad level. This posture has been bolstered after the Mughniyah’s assassination, and are reminiscent of the preparations made by the Syrian armed forces in the summer of 2007, before the Israel Air Force attack in northeast Syria.

Israel sees the Syrians’ readiness mostly in their missile units, as well as in artillery and rocket battalions. There is also a bolstering of forces along the border with Lebanon, which seems to follow growing domestic tensions there as a result of a deadlock in the process for selecting a new president.

Smaller units have also been deployed in other areas, and an effort is evident to raise the level of preparedness of reserve units. 

Meanwhile, Iran is still busy arming and training illegal militias in Iraq.  Kimberly Kagan of the Institute for the Study of War writes in the WSJ about the Persian state’s proxy war against the U.S in Iraq:

The recent fighting in Iraq has also revealed much about our enemies. The intensity of Special Groups activities rose from January to March; U.S. and Iraqi forces found the large caches of EFPs and new Iranian rockets that often precede a Special Groups offensive. The Basra operations seem to have prompted the Special Groups and the Mahdi Army to launch this offensive prematurely, not according to plan. It did not succeed.

Iran and Mr. Sadr could not simply unleash a floodtide of violence that would overwhelm Iraqi Security Forces partnered with U.S. units, because they are more capable of handling the situation. For all of his nationalist rhetoric, Mr. Sadr is evidently not in control of his movement — it appears that the decision to fight or not rested with the Qods Force commander and not with him. But Mr. Sadr’s militia remains a reserve from which the Special Groups can and will draw in crisis.

These events provide an enormous opportunity for either the U.S. or for Iran – and whichever state responds most intelligently and quickly to the circumstances on the ground will gain the benefit. The U.S. should encourage the Iraqi government to defeat Iran’s proxies and agents, and should provide the requisite assistance. It should encourage and support the Iraqi government’s laudable determination to establish the rule of law throughout Iraq, not just where U.S. forces are present.

While North Korea and Iran continue to make nice with the Assad regime, pressure has been issued in the form of creating a watchlist of ships who stop at Syrian ports.  The decision signals what most believe to be a reaction to Syria’s meddling in Lebanon:

The decision, which could put pressure on businesses trading or shipping through Syria, was a further blow to long strained ties that had held out brief hopes of improvement last November when the United States courted Syria for the launch of new Palestinian-Israeli peace talks.

Syria was placed on a so-called “Port Security Advisory List” amid “concerns about the connections between Syria and international terrorist organizations,” the State Department’s deputy spokesman Tom Casey told reporters.

The move allows the Coast Guard “to impose some additional port security measures to ships traveling to or arriving in US ports that have previously been either departing from Syria or have called on Syrian ports,” he said.

Casey added he understood the measures would affect any ship that has visited Syria during its last five ports of call, but referred reporters to the Coast Guard and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for further information.

Also, an unnamed Egyptian official has claimed that the recent developments in Gaza have served Syrian interests in diverting attention away from its actions in Lebanon:

According to Egyptian sources, the heads of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, currently based in Damascus, are the only ones authorized to make a decision regarding a cease-fire with Israel, and it is possible that the Syrian government is behind the failure of truce negotiations thus far. “All the evidence points to the fact that Syria wants to divert attention from Lebanon and point the spotlight on Gaza,” the Egyptian official said.

The current escalation [of violence] in the Palestinian arena serves the Syrian interests,” they said, explaining that the embarrassment caused by continuing violence in Gaza to Arab Leaders may prompt the Arab nations to send high-level representation to the upcoming Arab summit hosted by Syria later this month, after having threatened that state leaders will not attend if Syria continues to interfere in the political crisis in Lebanon.

The Egyptian accusations against Syria are directly linked to rising tensions in the Arab world currently. The absence of Arab leaders from the Arab summit will cause great embarrassment to Damascus, as the host country, and likely prevent the success of the summit.

The Egyptian officials added that they had frozen efforts to mediate a truce between Israel and the Palestinians until after the Arab summit at the end of March. They said that Suleiman, who is responsible for the mediation efforts, will accompany Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak this week to Poland and Dakar, which will prevent him from advancing truce negotiations.

I haven’t written anything about the much talked about conference this week in Annapolis, Maryland, probably because of the overwhelming amount of skepticism surrounding it.  Not that pessimistic attitudes are necessarily surprising in this case; these conferences usually don’t produce much.  Of course circumstances differ this time around. There were some pretty interesting storylines surrounding the attendance of several Arab states, and the speculation that perhaps a deal could be made vis-a-vis Syria, concerning their support for Hezbollah.

These conferences always produce speculation (sometimes interesting), I’d imagine primarily because people would like to see something concrete accomplished.  An article in the WSJ titled “After Annapolis” summed up some of the basic struggles the United States and its’ president will face on this issue.  It failed however, as its’ title may have suggested it would, to provide anything to really look forward to after this conference except for what leverage Bush may have in the future in regards to the Israel and the Palestinians.  A telling paragraph from the middle of that article follows:

Then again, if the Arab regimes were really keen to settle the conflict, they might be slightly more forthcoming than Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, who attended on the condition that he wouldn’t shake hands with Israelis. And they might be more realistic than Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat, who has ruled out recognizing Israel as a Jewish state even though Israel was created explicitly as such by a U.N. resolution approved 60 years ago today. As historian Bernard Lewis pointed out in these pages Monday, how do these so-called moderates expect Israel to cede territory when they’ll cede nothing on the right of Israel simply to exist?

Another question to ponder: don’t these conferences, and their subsequent declarations to work towards peace, only serve to harden these Arab positions?  Additionally, as long as there are people taking ‘extreme’ positions in the Middle East, will any leader be able to publicly accept to correct any of the aforementioned criticisms?  These “so called moderates” and the positions they have to take in public are largely determined by what the extremes are saying, because right now the Arab world has no courageous leaders. 

The issue of Hamas, from what I have read on the conference, was dealt with in the usual rhetoric that achieves nothing.  Will re-establishing “dialogue” solve this problem?  That article is a harsh critique, but these words by Hamas’ Gaza chief sum up my point:

Earlier this month, Hamas’ chief in Gaza, Mahmoud al-Zahar, a frequent visitor to Iran, became the most senior Hamas terror leader to state this when he told a massive rally: “Israel thinks Fatah in the West Bank is there to serve it, but we will take over the West Bank the way we took over Gaza.”

It was only five months ago al-Zahar’s Hamas forces humiliated Abbas when in less than seven days they took complete control of the Gaza Strip, seizing all American-backed Fatah security compounds in the territory and even taking possession of weapons that our tax dollars provided to Abbas. America’s Fatah paper tiger pathetically fell like a deck of cards.

Iran’s President has already declared the conference a “failure”, although one wonders whether he really would know why. 

Update: Israel’s Foreign Minister wondered aloud, in the presence of her Arab counterparts, as to why nobody would shake her hand.  The article mentions that she looked over at the Saudi FM, who had stated his refusal earlier to shake hands with the enemy.  I hope she really did “berate” them, as per the article’s title. 

Scroll down to the second half of that page, and you’ll find something potentially much juicier:

Did a high-profile meeting take place between Israel and Syria during the Annapolis peace conference this week?

Kuwaiti daily al-Jarida reports that the Palestinian track may not have been the only one being pursued by Israeli officials and claims Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Fayssal Mekdad met in secret at an unnamed hotel in Washington.

No further details were provided regarding the clandestine meeting and no official source confirmed it had taken place.

Very possibly, and they’re stepping up the threats to the ‘rebels’ over the border.  Although an incursion, or what the article describes as a raid, is may not be happening immediately it seems the Turkish military is close to getting full government approval for military action. ME Times: Iraq incursion threat is what Turkish generals were waiting for.

Erdogan confirmed Wednesday the government was drafting a motion asking parliament to authorize the deployment of Turkish soldiers abroad - a move required by the constitution.

“The preparations for a motion have started and are continuing,” he said.

The draft could be submitted to parliament as early as next week, political sources said.

Ankara’s move comes after PKK militants were blamed for attacks, this weekend, which killed 15 soldiers, most of them in Turkey’s southeast Sirnak province near Iraq’s northern border.

It was the worst death toll - 13 soldiers in one attack alone - since 1995.

Read more

62 Islamists were arrested, allegedly belonging to a terrorist group called Takfir & Higra, on suspicion of plotting to attack the Ibn Khaldun Center For Development Studies in Cairo.  The center is led by Egyptian sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim. 

62 terrorists trying to blow up one target?  Is this the beginning of a bad joke?

The Reuters piece linked above gets interesting midway through (emphasis mine):

The director of the Ibn Khaldoun Centre, Ahmed Rizk, said he had received no formal notice from the government about the arrests but planned to increase security around the centre.

Security sources said the men, who have not yet been formally charged but were in custody pending an investigation, denied the accusations.

Over the years the Egyptian authorities have detained several groups of what they call extremists on suspicion of planning acts of violence. But some of the cases have never gone to trial and the suspects have been freed.

Egypt’s Al Masry Al Youm newspaper reported that the men were plotting to blow up the centre with a car bomb and had been in contact with “extremist elements” abroad. The paper reported that the group had hatched the plot after reading Ibrahim’s secular writings and learning of his ties to the United States.

Ibrahim is currently outside Egypt and has said he faced possible arrest should he return as old accusations against him were revived, this time in the form of private lawsuits.

Ibrahim has been lobbying Washington and the European Union to demand greater progress toward more judicial independence, greater media and civil freedoms and internationally supervised elections in exchange for foreign aid.

Doesn’t it sound like it’s the government that is trying to send him a message that he’s in danger and not welcome back in the country anymore? 

Updated: Read more

There’s a report today of a deal that saw 85 members of Hamas enter Egypt through the Rafah border in exchange for extradition of a terror suspect whom Egyptian intelligence services have been tracking for a while

Hamas transferred a fugitive al Qaida member to Egypt on Sunday, in return for Egypt’s opening the Rafah Crossing to dozens of Hamas and Islamic Jihad members, Israel Radio quoted Palestinian news agency Ma’an as reporting on Monday.

On Sunday, Israel was taken by surprise when Egypt abruptly allowed 85 Palestinians, most of them Hamas members, who had been stranded in Egypt since the Islamist group seized control of the Gaza Strip in mid-June to return home.

The unexpected move contradicted agreements Israel had with Egypt regarding the Rafah Crossing.

The Palestinians refused to enter Gaza through any of the crossings controlled by Israel.

Sources in the defense establishment estimated that many of the group had undergone training in Iran and Syria

Another anti-Syrian MP as well.  And a few days before the Lebanese parliament is supposed to elect a new president.  I wonder who could be meddling in Lebanon’s affairs?

MP Antoine Ghanem was killed, along with four other people in a massive car bombing Wednesday in a busy, mainly-Christian neighborhood of Beirut, the latest in a spate of attacks against prominent anti-Syrian figures.

Lebanese newspapers said the assassination was a clear message ahead of a parliamentary session Tuesday to elect a president, amid a near total deadlock between the Western-backed majority and the pro-Damascus opposition.

“Antoine Ghanem, a bloody message for the majority and the presidential election,” said the front-page headline of the leading An Nahar newspaper.

World powers condemned the attack as a blatant bid to destabilize Lebanon ahead of the vote, but the country’s former power-broker Syria denied any involvement.

How is it that Lebanon is still considered sovereign? How many more politicians need to be murdered by foreign governments, or wars need to be started by an illegal militia which is stronger than the nation’s army before the world’s powers begin to discuss Lebanon as one of the key battlegrounds for regional influence in the Middle East?

Check out Beirut Beltway for updates.

The PM makes a statement: “Bomb won’t stop Lebanon poll”

Update: Antoine Ghanem has been buried. Lebanon grieves.

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